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Abstract 
Few debates, political or academic, are as conflictual as those over racial policy. 
In this paper, we explore the possibility that individual attitudes are internally con­
flictual through the use of inferential statistical techniques that estimate variability 
in individual respondents' considerations about racial policy. We consider six sep­
arate core beliefs potentially relevant towards racial policy choice (modern racism, 
anti-black stereotyping, authoritarianism, individualism, and anti-semitism) , for four 
different policy choices. We evaluate two separate models for the source of individ­
ual variance: conflicting values and direct effects of values. Our analysis leads us to 
conclude that modern racism trumps rival explanatory variables in explanations of 
racial policy choice, and that variability in attitudes toward racial policy is due to 
uncertainty, and not to ambivalence. 
Are Americans Ambivalent Towards Racial 
Policies?*
R. Michael Alvarez John Brehm 
Few contemporary policy debates are as conflictual as those debates over policy 
intended to redress racial inequality. Elites conflict over the specific terms of policy, 
over the appropriateness of particular goals, and over the symbols and rhetoric that 
define the issues. For some individuals, racial policy wears all the signs of a policy 
debate that yields internal conflict, or ambivalence over policy choices. Our specific 
research question centers on the sources of individual ambivalence, manifested as 
greater implicit variation in the range of considerations in response to survey ques­
tions. 
If one thinks of a survey response as a sample from an individual's range of consid­
erations over policy choice (Zaller 1992) , then one of the more important attributes 
of the range of considerations is its variance (the diversity of potential answers a re­
spondent might supply) , as well as its central tendency. Wide variation in responses 
from an individual might be due to unreflective response manufactured at the door, 
or it might be symptomatic of internalized conflict over the specific policy domain. 
The first form of response variability is uncertainty, distinguished from other forms 
of response variability in that additional information helps the respondent to sharpen 
his or her opinions. Under uncertainty, response variability is inversely proportional 
to the respondent's political informedness. The second form of response variability is 
ambivalence, wherein additional information only heightens the internalized conflict 
(Liberman and Chaiken 1991; Tetlock 1986) , making the policy choices more difficult 
and responses more variable. 
The different origins of response instability are consequential - the doorstep opin­
ion suggests that respondents are ill-equipped to participate in the debate, while the 
internally conflictual opinion means that the debate itself is difficult. Variation due 
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to ill-formed responses indicts the respondent or the political process, while variation 
due to difficult choices identifies the very bone marrow of politics. 
As we have argued elsewhere (Alvarez and Brehm 1995) , a source for conflict over 
policy choices can be conflict between core values. If multiple core values pertain to a 
policy choice, yet they implicate different answers in the debate, then respondents who 
heed those values will be conflicted in their answers. Difficult policy choices typically 
involve such conflicts. Abortion policy is difficult for the respondent who prizes a 
woman's reproductive choice, but also believes that human life begins :well before 
birth. Environmental policy choices are tough for the respondent who values clean 
air and water, yet regrets imposing any costs on industry that might lead towards 
the loss of jobs. The decision to go to war against a foreign tyrant is conflictual for 
those who rue committing American troops to battle. 
Do conflicting core values undercut racial policy? According to several prominent 
scholarly treatments, the answer is in the affirmative. Rokeach (1973) identifies a 
significant fraction of respondents torn between two terminal values, freedom and 
equality, over diverse policy choices, including race. Katz and Hass (1988) attribute 
whites' conflict over racial policy to two competing value orientations, a protestant 
ethic and a humanitarian-egalitarian orientation. Relatedly, sociological descriptions 
of American politics turn on two competing core values of individualism and commu­
nalism (e.g. , Lipset 1967; Williams 1979). 
Do these competing core values implicate internalized conflict? Again, the answer 
in the scholarship appears to be yes. McConahay (1986) argues that the difference 
between the respondent's reactivity to "old-fashioned" racism scales (racial superior­
ity) and those measuring "modern" racism denotes a zone of ambivalence about race. 
Katz and Hass (1988) and Katz et al. (1986) argue that white subjects experience 
psychological tension and discomfort in response to the presence of cues activating 
conflicted racial attitudes. Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) demonstrate a residual core 
of aversive racism, even among subjects professing generalized support for racial pol­
icy. 
To even the most cursory student of the scholarship on racial attitudes, it is 
bluntly obvious that researchers collide over the basic forces that drive racial atti­
tudes. One group (Kinder and Sears 1981; Kinder 1986; McConahay 1986) contends 
that "symbolic racism," a combination of anti-black affect with traditional American 
values, drives white resistance to racial policy. By this argument, whites who oppose 
such policies as affirmative action or busing on the grounds that blacks are getting 
more than they deserve, are motivated by a form of racism that has replaced overt 
expressions of racial superiority. Sniderman and his colleagues (Sniderman and Ha­
gen 1985 ,  Sniderman and Tetlock 1986, Sniderman and Piazza 1993) argue that the 
symbolic racism fails because it confounds the policy choice with the attitude, while 
at the same time ignoring the continuing presence of simple anti-black affect as a 
source of white opposition to racial policy. We take the level of conflict about the 
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sources and meaning of white opposition to racial programs as one piece of evidence 
that individual attitudes may be in conflict. 
Both groups of partisans in the debate have direct evidence about individual am­
bivalence toward race. When one alters the question in relatively minor ways, one 
can elicit entirely different responses, indeed, even different patterns of responses. 
Among other persistent differences, Kinder and Sanders (1990) demonstrate through 
split-form questionnaire that framing the debate as a question of "reverse discrimina­
tion" caused egalitarian respondents to see affirmative action as undesirable, whereas 
a frame of "unfair advantages" caused egalitarians to support affirmative action. Sni­
derman and Piazza (1993) conclude their book: 
Of the myriad findings we have reported on contemporary American 
racial attitudes, the one to which we ourselves attach the most importance 
is the pliability of the policy positions of substantial numbers of whites on 
specific issues of race. It has long been assumed that whites are dug in on 
racial issues. In fact, large numbers of whites can be dislodged from the 
positions they have taken on many issues of race by calling their attention
to countervailing considerations (p. 178) . -
The deepest irony of the dispute is that both groups of partisans acknowledge that 
the framing of the debate determines how respondents will answer questions about 
racial policy, and that both groups of partisans believe that the lability of response 
echoes the broader policy debate among elites. 
Our point is not to settle, or hardly to enter, the argument over the existence 
of symbolic racism as a distinct source of racial attitudes. Our specific interest is 
to assess how levels of support for these values accounts for both the policy choices 
and the variability of those choices. Our paper has three parts. We first develop 
six scales for pertinent values from the 1991 Race and Politics survey: symbolic 
racism, anti-black stereotyping, authoritarianism, anti-semitism, egalitarianism, and 
individualism. We then turn towards an evaluation of the effect of these values upon 
policy choices in this survey. Using a heteroskedastic probit model, we look at both 
the probability of support for the policy and the implicit variance in that probability. 
Finally, we reflect upon the relationship between internalized conflict at the level of 
individual survey response to the debate among policy makers. 
1 Measurement of Racial Values 
We construct our core beliefs scales on the basis of the 1991 Race and Politics Sur­
vey, a data set collected by the Survey Research Center of the University of California 
(Berkeley) . The survey was a telephone interview based on random-digit dialing using 
a stratified two-phase sample selection procedure. The first phase of the procedure 
sampled from known area codes and prefixes, appending a four-digit random number 
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to generate a complete ten-digit telephone number. The second phase drew dispro­
portionately from sample strata containing at least one known residential number, 
although drawing also from strata where there was no known residential number.1 
The target population consisted of all English-speaking adults over 18 years old, re­
siding in households with telephones, within the 48 contiguous states. The total 
sample size was 2 ,223, with a response rate of 65.3% (a response rate in excess of 
typical rates for telephone surveys) . 
The unique aspect of the Race and Politics Survey was the profusion of split ques­
tionnaires, randomly assigned to respondents, made possible by a Computer Aided 
Telephone Interview approach. Each of the four dependent variables we consider 
altered important components of the question. For purposes of scale construction, 
however, we were stymied by the split samples, and employed only those questions 
which were asked of all respondents. 
Six concepts assume varying degrees of prominence in scholarly explanations for 
variation in racial attitudes. We produce scales for each of the six concepts by the 
method of confirmatory factor analysis (details of the coding and the confirmatory 
factor analysis are in Appendix 1) .  Each scale is coerced to 0-1 bounds, where a 
1 denotes the maximum observed level for the scale (e.g., a 1 for authoritarianism 
denotes a respondent who provides the most authoritarian answers of the sample) .  
We reverse three of the scales (modern racism, authoritarianism, and egalitarianism) 
to reflect our preference for interpretation of the scales. The reader should note that 
the maximum and minimum levels for each scale do not reflect absolutes, but only the 
maximum or minimum observed for the sample. The overall fit for the confirmatory 
factor model is adequate with a Goodness of Fit Ind�x of 0.86. 
The first scale is a measure of "modern racism." According to the various authors 
(e.g., Kinder and Sears 1981; Kinder 1986; Kinder and Sanders 1990; McConahay 
1986) symbolic or modern racism denotes a conjunction of anti-black affect with 
traditional American values, taking form in the sense that blacks are receiving more 
attention from government or other advantages than they deserve. 2 
We located three questions which tap into the idea of modern racism. One of these 
questions is a simple three point Likert scale asking respondents to rate the amount 
of attention that government has been paying to minorities. The second and third 
indicators ask how angry the respondent feels about giving "blacks and other mi­
norities special advantages in jobs and schools," and the other about "spokesmen for 
1 "Known" residential numbers were drawn from a tape created by Donnelly Marketing Services. 
See Casady and Lepkowski 1991 for further details of the sampling methodology. 
2McConahay (1986) prefers the term "modern" racism, with the explicit idea that the underly­
ing racial attitudes are possible only in the post civil rights movement period, and because "old­
fashioned" racism might also be symbolic (i.e., not grounded in realistic group conflict). Kinder 
(1986) prefers the term "symbolic" racism, since the "traditional" American values invoked by the 
idea are hardly "modern." Neither label is perfect. We opt for "modern" racism in the context of 
the specific questions since all refer (obliquely) to policies only in practice since the 1960s. 
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minorities who are always complaining that blacks are being discriminated against." 
The "how angry" variables are scaled from 0 (doesn't bother) to 10 (extremely an­
gry) , while the first question is scaled oppositely (from 1 (too much attention) to 5 
(not paying enough attention)). Considering the range of the indicators, the indi­
cators load roughly equally on the underlying scale, with estimated factor loadings 
of -.27 (anger about giving blacks and other minorities special advantages) and -.34 
(anger about spokesmen for minorities who are always complaining); the attention to 
minority problems indicator has been constrained to a coefficient of 1 .0. 
This scale probably won't satisfy either group of partisans in the debate over the 
relevance of "modern racism." One of Sniderman and Tetlock's chief objections to the 
modern racism concept is that the scales often treat policy choices as independent 
variables in the same models that purport to explain policy choices as dependent 
variables. 
... [I]t is gratuitous to equate opposition to affirmative action with 
racial prejudice - gratuitous because it would otherwise be possible to 
examine the actual relation between the two, and thus establish as a 
matter of fact, and not of definition, how and to what degree the two 
are connected. Quite simply, defining opposition to affirmative action as 
racism precludes falsification of the prediction that the two are indeed 
related, at the cost of making the relation between them a tautology 
(Sniderman and Tetlock 1986, p. 135). 
In order to be sensitive to these objections, we replicate all of our models excluding 
the modern racism scale. But in defense of the measure, we note that the specific 
policy referents in the measures are rather oblique. The "attention" variable asks the 
respondent to evaluate the amount of "attention" from government to the problems 
of minorities, hardly in the same level of specificity as the dependent variables we 
discuss later in this paper. The latter two questions ask about a diffuse "anger" 
provoked by a policy (special advantages) or "complaining" spokesmen. 
The weakness in these indicators as seen from the advocates of the symbolic racism 
concept would be the absence of specific referents to traditional American values. If 
symbolic racism is the conjunction of anti-black affect and traditional American val­
ues, then these questions are decidedly weak as far as their emphasis on "unearned 
advantages." The language here emphasizes "too much attention" or "special advan­
tages" which orbits somewhere near the meaning of unearned advantages. 
The second of these scales is a measure of anti-black stereotyping. Each of the 
indicators for the anti-black stereotyping scale is a response to a question of the form 
"How about X? On a scale from 0 to 10, how well do you think that it describes 
most blacks?" where the scale ranges from 0 ( "very inaccurate" ) to 10 ( "very accu­
rate" ) .  Since this scale is ultimately reversed, each of the factor loadings represents 
a score in a pro-black direction. The scale performs adequately. All of the negative 
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attributes (aggressive, lazy, boastful, irresponsible, complaining) have positive, large, 
and statistically significant coefficients.3 
In place of the modern racism scale, Sniderman and Piazza (1993) argue for sep­
arate consideration of anti-black stereotyping, and alternative values: authoritarian­
ism, anti-semitism, and individualism. In a series of impressive bivariate analyses, 
Sniderman and Piazza demonstrate that authoritarianism is more strongly correlated 
with opposition to racial policy than measures of individualism (which they take to 
be the core of the modern racism argument). 
The authoritarianism scale draws upon six indicators, each of which is a response 
on a ten point scale to a question of the form "How about X? On a scale from 0 to 10, 
how important is that to you?" where 0 denotes "one of the least important things" 
and 10 denotes "one of the absolutely most important things." (This scale is not 
reversed.) These six indicators correspond to three aspects of the classic "F scale" of 
authoritarianism (Adorno et al. 1950, pp. 228-41) - conventionalism, authoritarian 
submission, and authoritarian aggression - albeit to varying degrees of coherence. 
"Conventionalism" referred to "rigid adherence to conventional, middle-class values" 
and is captured here with "Following God's will" and "Improving standards of po­
liteness in everyday behavior." "Authoritarian submission" meant a "submissive, un­
critical attitude toward idealized moral authorities of the in-group" and is measured 
here with "Preserving the traditional ideas of right and wrong." "Authoritarian ag­
gression" referred to a "tendency to be on the lookout for, and to condemn, reject, 
and punish people who violate conventional values" and is measured by "Respect for 
authority," "Strengthening law and order" and "Respect for American power."4 All 
six of the loadings for the indicators are strong, where "preserving the traditional 
ideas of right and wrong" and "respect for authority" are the strongest pair. 
Our scale for individualism is measured by three items, two of which are questions 
of a similar form to those used for the authoritarianism scale (in fact, part of the same 
battery of questions) . "Self-reliance" is scaled at 1 ,  but "emphasizing individual 
achievement and excellence on the job" scales at only .30. Likewise, "(How about) 
Government officials interfering and trying to tell us what we can and can't do with 
our own lives" scales at only .15. This is admittedly a weak scale, and any effect that 
it has in our subsequent analysis is likely to be attenuated due to the inferior level of 
measurement. 
The next scale that we employ in our analysis measures anti-semitism. Sniderman 
and Piazza (1993) find modest (approximately .3) correlations between assessments of 
3We have replicated our analysis with a second scale for anti-black stereotyping, where the mea­
sures include both positive and negative stereotypes. This alternative scale has some serious defects 
in that the positive and negative attributes appear to load better on separate scales than on a single 
scale. 
4This scale thus omits at least six aspects of the F scale: anti-intraception, superstition, power 
and toughness, destructiveness and cynicism, projectivity, and sex. One might consider the "respect 
for American power" question to tap into the "power and toughness" aspect of the F scale. 
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negative attributes of blacks and agreement with elements of an anti-semitic scale. In 
several analyses in their book, Sniderman and Piazza utilize anti-semitism as a mea­
sure of prejudice because of "[their] believe that the heart of prejudice is captured by 
the notion of ethnocentrism (p. 107)." We use five Likert scale questions (four point 
scales which do not include the hedging response of "neither agree nor disagree" ) .  At 
face value, one of the five questions does not seem to be anti-semitic: "Most Jews are 
ambitious and work hard to succeed." We have two responses. The reader should 
recall that the purpose of the scale is to measure a religious stereotype in order to de­
note prejudice and ethnocentrism. The significant part of the apparently anomalous 
question is "Most Jews" in light of construction of a stereotype. Our second answer 
is data-driven: when we delete this question from the scale, the remaining loadings 
plunge by nearly 25%. 
Finally, we construct a scale for "egalitarianism." The nominal conflict between 
egalitarianism and individualism appears prominently in the literature on attitudes 
toward racial policy. Katz and Hass (1988) find in experimental work that priming 
subjects to consider one value or the other significantly increased scores on corre­
sponding attitudes, but not on attitudes corresponding to the non-primed value. In 
other words, the two scales operate independently, and each has the potential to 
significantly affect preferences for racial policy. Lipset and Schneider (1978) , in a 
review of a range of survey data, see the dynamic of attitudes towards racial policy 
as "between two values that are at the core of the American creed - individualism 
and egalitarianism ( 43) ." 
As with our scale for individualism, the scale for egalitarianism is somewhat weak. 
While the first variable is fixed at 1 (more money b�ing spent to reduce unemploy­
ment) , the next variable loads at only .33. The non-Likert scale question loads at half 
that. Again, we expect that the effects of the egalitarianism scale in the estimation 
will be attenuated. 
Finally, we take note of the correlations among these six generated scales (see 
Appendix 1 for the full correlation matrix) . None of the scales are strongly correlated. 
The highest pairs of correlations include anti-black stereotyping and anti-semitism 
( .39) , and authoritarianism and individualism (.37) . Most of the remaining pairs of 
indicators are correlated at .25 or less. The lack of strong inter-correlations allows us 
to be more confident that our indicators are indeed tapping into separate dimensions 
of possible values underlying racial beliefs. 
These scales allow us to evaluate the relative weight of the competing explanations 
for opposition to racial policy, in a mode that is similar to any other analysis of pol­
icy choice. But we argue that understanding the choice is only one of the interesting 
aspects of the problem, and that understanding the variability in that choice, for each 
respondent, also matters. We employ a heteroskedastic probit technique, simultane­
ously modeling the probability of a choice and the variability of that probability. The 
next section details our application of this method. 
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2 Variability of Racial Policy Choices 
The mechanics of the heteroskedastic probit technique may be found in Appendix 2. 
Briefly, the idea behind the technique is to specify, and simultaneous estimate two 
related equations, one for the probability of a choice, the other for the variability of 
that probability. We refer to the first equation as the "Choice Model," and to the 
second equation as the "Variance Model." The heteroskedastic probit model can be 
applied to virtually any type of discrete policy choice. For example, in our previous 
paper we found substantial support for the hypothesis that many Americans are am­
bivalent , and not uncertain, about abortion policy choices, and that this ambivalence 
is determined by the conflict between two core values, the value of human life and 
respect for women's rights (Alvarez and Brehm 1995) .  
Here we are interested in examining the same hypothesis, except in the context of 
racial attitudes. As we discussed earlier, there is substantial discussion in the litera­
ture about the role that ambivalence plays in racial politics, even for individual choice. 
What has been absent is a direct examination of the form of the response variability 
(i.e. , uncertainty or ambivalence) . Ambivalence as the form of response variability 
entails two criteria, that individuals who are better informed exhibit greater response 
variability, because those individuals display conflict between core beliefs or values. 
Using the 1991 Race and Politics Survey and our heteroskedastic probit technique, 
we can examine policy choice variability, and evaluate whether it is ambivalence or 
uncertainty that characterizes variable opinions about racial policies . 
2.1 Choices About Racial Policy 
The 1991 Race and Politics Survey data has extensive data about different racial 
policy alternatives. In this paper, we focus our attention on only four different types 
of racial policy choices: federal set-aside programs for minorities, preferences for 
qualified blacks in university admissions, open housing laws, and whether to raise 
taxes to increase educational opportunities for minorities. We use only these four 
since they involved simple dichotomous (yes - no) policy choices. 5 
From the 1991 survey data, we recoded four dependent variables for each type 
of racial policy choice. The four binary variables are each coded so that 1 indicates 
an affirmative response (the respondent favors federal set-asides for minorities, they 
believe that there ought to be preferences for qualified blacks in university admissions, 
there ought to be open housing laws, and that taxes ought to be raised for educational 
opportunities for minorities) and 0 indicates a negative response. Given this coding, 
each of the four heteroskedastic probit models are estimating the probability of an 
5Many of the remaining racial policy choices in this data involved ordered discrete choices. We 
reserve the analysis of those questions for future work, since the econometrics of a heteroskedastic 
ordered probit model is beyond the scope of this present research. 
8 
affirmative response, and the coefficients we estimate should be interpreted with that 
in mind. 
However, there is one complication we briefly mentioned in the previous section. 
One of the interesting aspects of the 1991 data involved the use of randomized question 
experiments which posed different varieties of each question to different respondents 
(Sniderman and Piazza 1993). That different question wordings were employed in this 
survey, though, greatly complicates the analysis of these data. To deal with the het­
erogeneity the question wording experiments impose on each dependent variable, we 
include in the choice functfon of each heteroskedastic probit model dummy variables 
which measure which question wording each respondent received. 6 
The first dependent variable is a three-version question about open housing: 
1. (Neutral, Dummy 1=0, Dummy 2=0, 57% yes) :  Suppose there were a community­
wide vote on a general housing issue and that there were two possible laws to
vote on. One law says that homeowners can decide for themselves who to sell
their houses to, even if they prefer NOT to sell to blacks. The other law says
that homeowners cannot refuse to sell to someone because of their race or color.
Which law would you vote for?
2. (Property Rights, Dummy 1=1, Dummy 2=0, 35% yes) : Some people believe
that homeowners should be free to decide for themselves who to sell their house
to, even if they prefer not to sell it to blacks. For example, some people might
say it isn't that they don't want to sell to blacks; it's just that they don't want
to be told what to do with their own property. In other words, they feel that
because it's their property, they should have the right to sell to anyone they
want to.
How do you feel about this? Do you think homeowners should be able to decide
for themselves who to sell their hoses to, even if they prefer not to sell to blacks,
or do you think homeowners should not be allowed to refuse to sell to someone
because of their race or color?
3. (Role of government, Dummy 1=0, Dummy 2=1 , 38% yes) : Some people believe
that the government should make an active effort to see that blacks can live
anywhere they choose, including white neighborhoods. Others believe that this
is not the government's business and it should stay of this. How do you feel?
(Is this an area the government should stay out of or should the government
make an active effort to see that blacks can live anywhere they can afford to -
including white neighborhoods?)
Both the property rights and role of government frames introduce a rationale for 
opposing rights of equal access to housing for blacks. The property rights frame in­
vokes one of the very "traditional values" embedded in the modern racism concept, 
and so advocates of this concept might expect the sign on the coefficient to be nega­
tive, and sizable (it is) . We do not see the same relationship to the role of government 
6 Although there were many variations in question format, we found few statistically significant 
interaction effects. That is, the effect of the different question wordings (denoted here by dummies) 
only shifted the base probability, and did not interact with any of the scales to an appreciable degree. 
9 
frame, although it introduces government intrusion, and a potential reactance effect. 
The dummy term for the role of government is also negative and sizable. (The co­
efficient on the role of government dummy is larger than the equivalent for property 
rights, although the two are statistically indistinguishable) . 
The second question manipulated a four-version split on set-asides, specifically, 
federal contracts for black contractors. 
1 .  (Dummy 1=0, Dummy 2=0, 38% yes) Many people believe .. . 
2. (Dummy 1=1 ,  Dummy 2=0, 35% yes) Many blacks believe . .  .
3. (Dummy 1=1,  Dummy 2=0, 39% yes) Many people are demanding . .  .
4. (Dummy 1=1 , Dummy 2=1 , 38% yes) Many blacks are demanding . .  .
. .  . that there should be a law to make sure that a certain number of federal
contracts go to black contractors. What do you think about such a law - is it
a good idea or a bad idea?
The "people/blacks" frame encourages racists to reject racial policy based on the 
requester. The "believe/demanding" frame introduces a reactance element . We would 
have expected that the signs on Dummy 1 ,  Dummy 2,  and the interaction of the two 
would all be negative. Only the coefficient for the "people/blacks" frame is negative, 
and it is not statistically significant. 
The third question is a second four-way split about raising taxes for education, 
although we opted to fold together responses on one of the splits (not to use the 
dummy) . 
· 
1 .  (Dummy 1=0, Dummy 2=0, 58% yes) Some people have said that taxes need 
to be raised to take care of pressing national needs. How do you feel - would 
you be willing to have your taxes raised a little in order to improve education 
in public schools? 
2 .  (Dummy 1=1 ,  Dummy 2=0, 62% yes) Both the President and Congress, in­
cluding both Democrats and Republicans, have decided that taxes need to be 
raised to take care of pressing national needs. How do you feel - would you be 
willing to have your taxes raised a little in order to improve education in public 
schools? 
3. (Dummy 1=0, Dummy 2=1, 51% yes) Some people have said that taxes need
to be raised to take care of pressing national needs. How do you feel - would
you be willing to have your taxes raised a little in order to improve educational
opportunities for minorities?
4. (Dummy 1=1 ,  Dummy 2=1 ,  64% yes) Both the President and Congress, includ­
ing both Democrats and Republicans, have decided that taxes need to be raised
to take care of pressing national needs. How do you feel - would you be willing
to have your taxes raised a little in order to improve educational opportunities
for minorities?
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The first variation in question (Some people/Both the President and Congress) ma­
nipulates the status of the advocate. One might expect that the higher status of the 
President and Congress would induce higher levels of support for policy. Since we saw 
no direct relevance of the status of the advocate to the racial nature of the question, 
we neglected to include a dummy. The second question would encourage racists to 
reject educational opportunities for minorities, since the only significant variation in 
the question specifies "minorities." The coefficient for Dummy 1 was negative, and 
sizable. 
The final question that we explore in this paper presented two versions of questions 
related to preference for qualified blacks in university admission. 
1. (Preference, Dummy 1=0, 31 % yes) Some people say that because of past dis­
crimination, qualified blacks should be given preference in university admissions.
Others say that this is wrong because it discriminates against whites. How do
you feel - are you in favor of or opposed to giving qualified blacks preference
in admission to colleges and universities?
2 . (Extra effort, Dummy l=l, 64% yes) Some people say that because of past
discrimination, an extra effort should be made to make sure that qualified blacks
are considered for university admission. Others say that this extra effort is
wrong because it discriminates against whites. How do you feel - are you in
favor of or opposed to making an extra effort to make sure qualified blacks are
considered for admission to colleges and universities?
The "preference" frame reflects a stronger policy than simple "extra effort." Hence, 
we expected the sign on Dummy 1 to be positive, and it was both positive and 
statistically significant. 
2.2 Specification of the Choice Function 
Other than the dummy variables in the choice function, our specification of this com­
ponent of the model was driven largely by the existing literature. One group argues 
that modern racism structures attitudes towards racial policy. Another suggests that 
the effect of other prejudices should be included, including anti-black attitudes, gen­
eralized out-group antipathy (in the form of anti-semitism) , and authoritarianism. 
A third group contends that the conflict of two core values - egalitarianism and 
individualism - determine racial attitudes. 
We allow for six different scales, as discussed in the previous section: modern 
racism, individualism, anti-black stereotyping, authoritarianism, anti-semitism, and 
egalitarianism. Each is a scale constructed on the basis of confirmatory factor anal­
ysis of various survey items, and each has been recoded to range from 0 to 1 ,  where 
1 indicates the maximum observed level of the scale. Our prior beliefs about the 
signs on each of the scales is that they should all be negative, with the exception of 
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egalitarianism. Higher levels of modern racism, individualism, anti-black stereotyp­
ing, authoritarianism, and anti-semitism, and lower levels of egalitarianism, should 
all be associated with lesser support for racial policy. We additionally include the 
respondent's self-placement on a liberal-conservative scale as a control in the choice 
model. We limit the estimates to non-black respondents. 
2.3 Specification of the Variance Function 
The specification of the variance function reflects our desire to test two competing 
explanations for differences across Americans in the variation of their racial policy 
beliefs. As we argued above, variation in policy beliefs may reflect fundamental 
uncertainty about the policy choice under discussion. In other words, people may 
simply lack information about the policy choices and what they might imply, and 
that uncertainty will be reflected in the variance function of the heteroskedastic pro bit 
model (Alvarez and Franklin 1994; Franklin 1991) .  
To control for the effect of uncertainty, we include in the specification of the vari­
ance function a variable which measures what we call "chronic information." This 
is a simple political information measure, based on the earlier measures advocated 
by Zaller (1992) . We use an additive scale which measures whether the respondent 
correctly knew the number of Supreme Court members and the maximum number of 
presidential terms. This variable is coded to range from 0 to 1 ,  where 1 indicates cor­
rect answers to both factual political information questions. We expect the estimated 
coefficient to be negative, which implies that with increased political information the 
amount of variance in policy choices diminishes. 
The 1991 survey data also includes three factual items which are race-related: 
the percentage of poor who are black, the percent arrested who are black, and the 
percentage of black males who are unemployed. We used responses to these three 
questions to develop a domain-specific racial information measure. Although the 
mechanics of the difference are far from clear, chronic information measures regularly 
outperform domain specific information measures (Zaller 1992) . 
The rival explanation for variability in attitudes toward racial policy is ambiva­
lence induced by core beliefs underlying racial attitudes. We set two criteria in order 
to identify ambivalence. The first is that additional information should not reduce, 
and may in fact heighten, the response variability. The second criteria is that re­
sponse variability should increase as core beliefs and values conflict. Prior research 
instructs us to attend to one particular source of conflict, between egalitarianism and 
individualism. To the extent that racial policies achieve egalitarianism by rejecting 
individualism, we should expect to see greater response variability among individuals 
who prize both egalitarianism and individualism. 
To test for the core belief conflict, we include the absolute values of the differences 
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of levels of egalitarianism and individualism. 7 To get an intuition for what this 
operationalization means, recall that each of these core value scales is coded so that 
the minimum score is 0 and the maximum is 1 .  Thus, when we use the absolute value 
of the differences, when a respondent's level of egalitarianism and individualism are 
in synch we get a measure of 0. When the respondent's level of egalitarianism and 
individualism are completely out of synch (i.e. , one is at the maximum, the other is 
at the minimum) ,  we get a measure of 1 .  In this particular case, we expect that if the 
conflict of the two values structures response variability, then this can only occur when 
both values are in synch. Hence, if ambivalence is the appropriate characterization, 
we expect that the coefficient on this measure to be negative and significant. 
A second way in which these scales might influence variability in racial attitudes is 
via a kind of measurement effect. Sniderman and colleagues (Sniderman and Piazza 
1993, Sniderman and Hagen 1985, Sniderman and Tetlock 1986) have argued that 
researchers should not hold that opposition to racial policy is an indication of racism, 
since opposition to racial policy might be grounded in non-racial objections. This is 
tantamount to holding that racists are relatively fixed in their opposition to racial 
policy, but that non-racists might be quite variable in attitudes about racial policy. 
We estimate a second set of heteroskedastic probit models which include the two 
primary racial core values, modern racism and anti-black stereotyping, in the variance 
function. Our expectation is that people who are more racist on these scales will have 
lower variance, hence that the sign of the direct effects of modern racism and anti­
black stereotyping should be negative. 
2.4 Results of the Heteroskedastic Probit Models 
We present our results organized by the specification of the variance function: the 
"conflict" specification is in Table 1 ,  and the "linear" specification is in Table 2. Each 
table gives estimates for model coefficients, standard errors, and x2 tests both for the 
general fit of the model and for the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
Estimation of the choice function yields results which shed light on the current 
debates about which core beliefs structure choices about racial policies. Across all of 
the models we estimated, only one of the six scales significantly affected support for 
racial policy: modern racism. Despite the weaknesses of the particular measure, in 
every specification of the variance model, for each of the four dependent variables, 
the modern racism scale is far and away the largest coefficient in the model. In 
every specification, the modern racism variable is statistically significant at p < .05 
7It is conceivable that conflict among the other scales might also lead to greater response variabil­
ity. An earlier version of this paper, in fact, included all possible combinations of scales in a similar 
test. None of the results to follow vary significantly with the results of the fully saturated test. We 
prefer the simpler test of conflict between egalitarianism and individualism as it is one based upon 
the standing literature. We can think of no similarly motivated reason to expect conflict among any 
other pair of values. 
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Table 1 :  Heteroskedastic probit estimates, 1991 Race and Politics Survey: Conflict 
Specification of Values 
Variable Housing Set-Asides Taxes University 
Choice Model 
Constant 2.03* 1.27* 1.87* .91 * 
(0.66) (0.41) (0.60) (0.31) 
Dummy 1 -0.69* -0.19 0.34* 1.27 * 
(0.24) (0.12) (0.15) (0.27) 
Dummy 2 -0.75* 0.10 -0.60* 
(0.26) (0.11) (0.21) 
Dummy 1 x Dummy 2 -0.04 -0.33 
(0.15) (0.20) 
Modern Racism -1.31* -1.84* -1.80* -2.29 * 
(0.46) (0.54) (0.57) (0.50) 
Individualism 0.20 -1.07* 0.69 -0.55 
(0.29) (0.41) (0.43) (0.30) 
Anti-black Stereotypes -0.32 0.16 -0.22 0.28 
(0.28) (0.29) (0.38) (0.28) 
Authoritarianism -0.58 0.16 0.69* 0.52 * 
(0.30) (0.26) (0.31) (0.29) 
Anti-Semitism -0.55* 0.91* -1.04* 0.52 * 
(0.26) (0.37) (0.38) (0.26) 
Egalitarianism -0.38* -0.54* -1.81* -0.68 * 
(0.21) (0.26) (0.65) (0.25) 
Ideology -0.05 -0.09* -0.07* -0.07 * 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Variance Model 
Domain Specific Information 0.55 -0.11 0.17 0.18 
(0.35) (0.22) (0.28) (0.22) 
Chronic Information -0.69* -0.70* -0.74* -0.17 
(0.28) (0.21) (0.25) (0.20) 
IEG-INI 0.34 0.48 1.10* 0.38 
(0.34) (0.31) (0.33) (0.23) 
Ideology 0.08 0.06 0.08* 0.01 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
N 1363 1396 1359 1494 
x2 192.6* 223.2* 199.0* 403.0 * 
Het. Test 10.6* 23.6* 22.0* 4.2 
"Dummyl" and "Dummy2" are question-specific variations in wording, see 
the main text for details. * : '!!. < .05. 
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Table 2 :  Heteroskedastic probit estimates, 1991 Race and Politics Survey: Linear 
Specification of Values 
Variable Housing Set-Asides Taxes University 
Choice Model 
Constant 1.85* 1.31* 0.81* 1.60 * 
(0.56) (0.44) (0.29) (0.52) 
Dummy 1 -0.60* -0.18 0.14 1.82 * 
(0.19) (0.10) (0.08) (0.46) 
Dummy 2 -0.66* 0.05 -0.26* 
(0.21) (0.08) (0.10) 
Dummy 1 x Dummy 2 -0.03 -0.12 
(0.13) (0.10) 
Modern Racism -1.13* -1.67* -0.90* -3.01 * 
(0.37) (0.50) (0.27) (0.81) 
Individualism 0.09 -0.83* 0.10 -1.00 * 
(0.26) (0.33) (0.18) (0.50) 
Anti-Black Stereotypes -0.24 -0.37 -0.06 0.25 
(0.22) (0.27) (0.16) (0.37) 
Authoritarianism -0.53* 0.07 0.32 -0.04 
(0.27) (0.20) (0.19) (0.40) 
Anti-Semitism -0.48* 0.72* -0.24 0.19 
(0.23) (0.27) (0.16) (0.34) 
Egalitarianism -0.40* -1.00* -0.47* -0.94 * 
(0.23) (0.33) (0.20) (0.40) 
Ideology -0.04 -0.00 -0.03 -0.06 
(0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) 
Variance Model 
Domain Specific Information 0.43 -0.11 -0.04 0.38 
(0.35) (0.20) (0.26) (0.24) 
Chronic Information -0.67* -0.76* -0.72* -0.20 
(0.29) (0.19) (0.24) (0.20) 
Modern Racism -0.17 -0.32 -1.27* 0.51 
(0.32) (0.32) (0.35) (0.27) 
Anti-Black Stereotypes 0.44 1.26* 0.71 0.46 
(0.42) (0.41 (0.39) (0.32) 
Ideology 0.06 0.00 0.10* 0.01 
(0.04) (0.00) (0.04) (0.03) 
N 1363 1396 1359 1494 
x2 263.0* 244.4* 204.6* 368.0 * 
Het. Test 39.6* 44.6* 27.6* 12.0 * 
"Dummy!" and "Dummy2" are question-specific variations in wording, see 
the main text for details. * : p < .05. 
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or better. Furthermore, the coefficient on modern racism is one of only two of the 
coefficients on the six variables that is always correctly signed (negative). We find this 
finding to be somewhat ironic, that the modern racism measure performs best, despite 
significant efforts to measure rival hypotheses. Egalitarianism is also a significant 
predictor of racial policy choice, such that those respondents who are more egalitarian 
are more likely to support the racial policy. The coefficients for egalitarianism in the 
choice models are always significant, although also substantially smaller than the 
corresponding coefficients for modern racism. 8 
Turning to the remaining four variables, we found that anti-black stereotyping 
was a consistent predictor of opposition to racial policy for two of the four dependent 
variables (housing and set asides) , although it was statistically significant only for 
one (housing) . Furthermore, we have evaluated the possibility that the collinearity of 
anti-black stereotyping and modern racism undermined the coefficient for anti-black 
stereotyping. When we exclude modern racism from the choice model, anti-black 
stereotyping does not appreciably improve as an explanatory variable. 
None of the remaining three scales (individualism, authoritarianism, and anti­
semitism) achieves any degree of consistency across the four dependent variables. 
The coefficients on the three variables are often incorrectly signed, although rarely 
statistically distinguishable from zero. 
Our primary interest is in the variance model. We turn first to the heteroskedas­
ticity likelihood ratio test, printed at the bottom of each table. With 4 degrees of 
freedom, the critical value for the heteroskedasticity likelihood ratio test in the conflict 
specification is 9.5 (at p < .05). The first three models exceed the cutoff, implying 
that responses are heterogenous. The last model (university admissions) does not 
exceed the critical value, and we cannot reject the assumption of homogeneous re­
sponse. The linear specification has five degrees of freedom, and the relevant critical 
value is 11.07 (at p < .05) .  Again, we can reject the assumption of homogeneity in 
the first three models, but not the fourth. 
Next, consider the estimated parameters of the variance models. Better ( chroni­
cally) informed respondents are less ambivalent about racial policy than less informed 
respondents. The effect of chronic information in the variance model is always nega­
tive,  and statistically significant at p < .05 or better for every variation of the housing 
and set asides questions. (The coefficient on information is negative for the latter two 
questions, although only slightly larger than the standard error) .  The effect of do­
main specific information, however, is never distinguishable from zero to a statistically 
8When we replicate the analysis without the modern racism measures, there are a few substan­
tive changes. Authoritarianism and anti-black stereotyping become negative, statistically significant 
variables for each of the four dependent variables under each of the three variance model specifica­
tions. To the extent that the modern racism measure "works" because it includes policy choices as 
evidence of attitudes toward race (i.e., the modern racism measure is endogenous), then one might 
prefer the specification without modern racism. The substantive results with respect to the variance 
model are unchanged. 
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significant degree. 
The distinction between "ambivalence" and "uncertainty" is that additional in­
formation reduces uncertainty, but does not necessarily reduce ambivalence. If the 
respondent is in a state of internalized conflict, then additional information only 
heightens the state of conflict. With attitudes toward abortion policy, we demon­
strated that better informed respondents were more ambivalent under "hard" policy 
choices (where core values were in conflict) , and less ambivalent under "easy" policy 
choices (where one core value dominates) . 
The consistent negative sign on chronic information implies that variance in at­
titudes toward racial policy is best characterized by "uncertainty," and not by "am­
bivalence." Does this finding suggest that the debate on racial policy might actually 
become consensual, i.e . ,  that variance in attitudes might be reduced? We hold on 
further interpretation of the effects of chronic information until the conclusion. 
The first of our specifications of the variance model (Table 1) posited that individ­
ual variance in attitudes toward racial policy was due to conflict between core values 
of egalitarianism and individualism. For instance, we expected that a respondent who 
had high, roughly equal levels of esteem for both egalitarianism and individualism 
would have greater implicit variance in his or her policy choices. The "conflict" model 
incorporates the absolute value of the difference in two scales. Our expectation was 
that the signs on the coefficients for these "conflict" terms would be negative. 
Instead, all four terms are positive, and one of these to a statistically significant 
degree. (We obtain a similar pattern from a fully saturated set of conflict terms 
among the six scales) . Overall, one would have to conclude that conflict between core 
values does not account for variance in attitudes, with conflict measured in this way. 
We set two criteria to distinguish ambivalence from uncertainty: that the effect 
of information is to increase ambivalence, because dissonance in core beliefs should 
be irresolvable. With respect to the four measures of attitudes toward racial policy 
in this essay, we found exactly the opposite: information reduces individual variance, 
and there was no evidence of conflict in core values as a source of variance. 
An alternative conception of the variance in attitudes toward racial policy is that 
the "fit" of attitudes toward racial policy as a function of racial attitudes varies by the 
level of racial attitudes. In other words, racists might have little variance in opposition 
to racial policy, but that non-racists might be quite variable in support for racial 
policy, since opposition to that policy might be grounded in nonracial foundations. In 
order to evaluate this conception, we include direct effects of modern racism and anti­
black stereotyping (the two strongest predictors of opposition to racial policy) in the 
variance model (Table 2). If this alternative conception holds, we would expect that 
the signs on the variance coefficients for modern racism and anti-black stereotyping 
should be negative, i .e. ,  that higher levels of each lead to less variance. 
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Overall, this argument for the source of individual variation fails. Of the eight 
coefficients on the direct effects, three are negative, and only one of these to a statis­
tically significant degree. None of the measures of anti-black stereotyping are either 
negative nor significant. But there is some indication that the argument might hold 
for modern racism. Three of the four terms on modern racism are negative, one to 
a statistically significant degree. The fourth model is also not heterogeneous, by the 
likelihood ratio test. An implication of this frankly provisional result is that it is 
touchy to infer from opposition or support for racial policy back to racial attitudes. 
With at least two of the four policy choices (set asides and taxes) , those who were 
lowest on the modern racism scale were of widest variance in their choices, meaning 
that those who were, by this measure, not racist might still be in opposition to policy. 
2.5 Magnitude of Estimated Effects 
The estimated effects of racial values and different specifications of heterogeneous 
responses allow only for rough tests of the hypotheses we have presented earlier. Just 
as with more common binary choice models, the heteroskedastic probit parameters 
are difficult to interpret on their own. Here we turn to another way of presenting the 
estimated effects of racial values and ideology upon policy choice, by examining the 
"first differences" for each of the important right-hand side variables. 
The "first difference" methodology is relatively simple (King 1989). Here we set 
each right-hand side variable to the sample mean value; with these values and the es­
timated coefficients, we can determine the probability that a hypothetical respondent 
would give a particular answer to a survey question. Then, for a particular inde­
pendent variable (say modern racism in the housing model) , we increase the value of 
that variable by two sample standard deviations, and then calculate the probability 
that this hypothetical respondent gave an affirmative answer to the housing question. 
The difference between these two probability estimates provides our "first difference" 
which can also be thought of as an estimate of the impact of a two standard deviation 
change in one independent variable, holding all other effects in the model constant. 
These "first differences" are presented for both of the specifications (given on the 
left) in Table 3. Recall that with the coding of the racial value scales, we expect to 
see positive "first differences" (indicating that the probability of affirmative response 
is greater for the first calculation [the mean] than the second [the mean plus two 
standard deviations]) for modern racism, individualism, anti-black stereotyping, au­
thoritarianism and anti-semitism, but negative "first differences" for egalitarianism. 
The probability differences in Table 3 do shed additional light on the debates sur­
rounding which core beliefs impact racial policy choices. Here is strong evidence that 
modern racism is the predominant variable which structures racial policy choices, 
specifically policies dealing with housing, set-asides, taxation and university admis­
sions. Modern racism's weakest effects are in the housing models, where a two stan-
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Table 3: Effects of Values and Ideology from Heteroskedastic Probit Models 
Variable Housing Set-Asides Taxes University 
Conflict Specification 
Modern Racism .16 .19 .16 .28 
Individualism -.02 .10 -.04 .05 
Anti-Black Stereotypes .04 -.02 .02 -.03 
Authoritarianism .06 -.02 -.05 -.06 
Anti-Semitism .07 -.13 .09 -.06 
Egalitarianism .05 .07 .16 .09 
Ideology .06 .10 .06 .09 
Linear Specification 
Modern Racism .16 .19 .21 .24 
Individualism -.01 .08 -.02 .07 
Anti-Black Stereotypes .03 .04 .01 -.02 
Authoritarianism .06 -.008 -.06 .003 
Anti-Semitism .07 -.10 .06 -.02 
Egalitarianism .06 .12 .11 .08 
Ideology .05 .00 .07 .05 
Note: From heteroskedastic probit estimates in Tables 1-2. 
<lard deviation increase in the modern racism scale leads to .13 to .16 drop in the 
probability that the respondent would support open housing laws. But an identical 
change in the modern racism scale leads to almost doubling on the drop in probability 
that the same hypothetical respondent would support affirmative action university 
admissions ( .23 to .28 changes in probability) . No other variable comes close to having 
this impact on racial policy choices. 
The estimated parameters in the variance function are also difficult to interpret. 
In Table 4 we present calculations which will allow us to discuss the magnitude of the 
estimated effects on the variation in respondent policy choices. Here we follow the 
logic of the "first difference" approach by estimating the underlying error variance for 
the same hypothetical respondent (mean values of all right-hand side variables) , with 
one of the error variance terms set to 0. We then estimate the error variance again, 
after changing that same variable to the maximal value (1 for the information and 
value terms, 6 for ideology) , while holding the other variables constant. In Table 4 
we give the difference between these two calculations. Again, we are interested in 
determining what impact a significant change in each independent variable has on 
the magnitude of the error variance. 
Among the two information variables, the inconsistent effects of domain specific 
information can again be seen. In three of the models race specific information has 
an effect opposite that we posited - higher race specific information leads to higher 
levels of error variance. In only the set-asides model do we see race specific information 
with the correctly signed effect, but it appears to have a relatively small magnitude. 
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Table 4: Effects of Variables on Error Variance 
Variable Housing Set-Asides Taxes University 
Conflict Specification 
Domain Sp. Info. .81 -.12 .31 .23 
Chronic Info. -.90 -.80 -1.35 -.21 
IEG- INI .42 .51 1.84 .46 
Ideology .08 .06 .11 .01 
Linear Specification 
Domain Sp. Info. .53 -.11 -.03 .72 
Chronic Info. -.75 -.84 -.50 -.34 
Modern Racism -.19 -.35 -.98 .86 
Anti-Black Stereotypes .48 1.39 .48 .79 
Ideology .39 .00 .40 .10 
Curvilinear Specification 
Domain Sp. Info. .40 -.33 .007 .72 
Chronic Info. -.58 -1.81 -.53 -.33 
Modern Racism -1.19 -6.17 -.86 -2.01 
Anti-Black Stereotypes -.53 -1.67 -.48 -.30 
Ideology .38 .47 .37 .00 
Note: From heteroskedastic probit estimates in Tables 1-2. 
But chronic political information consistently has the correct effect, with more 
chronic information leading to lesser error variance. The estimated effects are consis­
tent across the different dependent variables and the different error variance specifica­
tions. And compared to most of the other error variance effects, chronic information 
has a consistently large effect. 
What can these calculations tell us about the different specifications of racial core 
beliefs? The first specification we presented we called the "conflict specification," 
which estimated the effects of the conflict between egalitarianism and individualism 
and posited that individuals with greater conflict ought to lead respondents to have 
higher error variances (recall that with the coding of these two scales, the absolute 
value of their differences leads to variable in which conflict is coded 0 and agreement 
is coded 1 ) .  In Table 4 we see that the estimated effects on the error variance of this 
specification are incorrectly signed, and that they even are larger than the effects of 
chronic political information in two models (taxes and university admissions). 
The second specification was the linear specification of modern racism and anti­
black stereotypes. Increases in both of these variables ought to decrease error vari­
ance. Only three of the estimates (modern racism in the housing, set-asides and 
taxes models) conform to this expectation. None of the anti-black stereotype effects 
are correctly signed, and again one is of considerable magnitude relative to chronic 
information (set-asides). 
In general, several conclusions can be taken from these empirical results. First, 
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as far as choices about these four racial policies are concerned, they are largely a 
function of modern racism. Second, we have shown that three of these four racial 
policy alternatives provoke heterogeneous responses (housing, set-asides and taxes) . 
And last, our results indicate that the variability in respondent choices about racial 
policies is more due to uncertainty than to conflicting core beliefs. 
3 Conclusion 
In short, we find evidence to rile both sides of the debate on racial attitudes. The 
principal disagreement is over · the importance of modern racism, where one camp 
holds that the modern racism measure neglects the effects of rival hypotheses: anti­
black stereotyping, individualism, generic out-group dislike (proxied here with anti­
semitism) , and authoritarianism. The modern racism measure is substantively the 
most important predictor of attitudes toward racial policy. Yet we also found that 
it may be difficult to infer back from opposition to the policy to the attitudes, since 
those who were least racist by the modern racism measure were more likely to be 
"accidentally" in opposition to the policy. 
We also found evidence that the one point of agreement between the two sides 
might be in error. Both camps agree that attitudes toward racial policy are highly 
sensitive to question wording, and that ambivalence characterizes much of American 
attitudes toward racial policy. Yet if we distinguish ambivalence from other forms 
of individual variability in attitudes by the role of information and the underlying 
conflict in core beliefs, "ambivalence" is probably the wrong term. Additional in­
formation reduced individual variance, and there was scant evidence that conflict in 
racially relevant attitudes led to greater variability. "Uncertainty" seems like the 
better word to us. 
That the individual variability in attitudes toward racial policy stems from un­
certainty, and not ambivalence, has significant political implications. If we had found 
that ambivalence towards racial policies in the minds of Americans was tied directly 
to their core beliefs, then the only way to resolve this ambivalence politically would 
be to change the underlying core beliefs. This would certainly seem a difficult task. 
On the other hand, we found that the variability in attitudes toward racial policy 
grow largely out of uncertainty. This is consistent with past research: 
The most important thing to appreciate about the thinking of whites 
on race, we now believe, is that many of them do not very often think 
about it at all . . .  But there are good reasons why whites might not make 
the issue of race central to their concerns. They neither suffer directly from 
the problem of racial inequality, nor see themselves as directly responsible 
for it. The problem of race is, like many other problems of public policy, 
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a secondary concern in the daily lives of whites and of only occasional 
interest to them (Sniderman and Piazza 1993: 154) . 
The political implications, then, are that to change the minds of many Americans 
about racial policies it is necessary to reduce their uncertainty about the policies. 
This does not mean that, though, that the reduction of variability in racial at­
titudes lead to consensus in public opinion about the "correct" direction of racial 
politics. While Americans would become more rooted in their opinions about public 
policy, roughly equal numbers could be rooted on opposite ends of any racial issue, 
which would be difficult to resolve politically. 
So, there are no easy answers to the dilemma of race in American politics. While 
we found that opinions about abortion policies were ambivalent due to conflicting core 
beliefs, we have shown here that opinions about racial policies are not ambivalent, 
but due to uncertainty. That does not make the resolution of debates about either 
issue any easier to resolve, nor does it make the search for general models of public 
opinion any more tractable. 
Why is it that attitudes toward abortion appear to be ambivalent, while those 
toward racial policy appear to be better characterized as uncertain? We offer some 
speculations at this point. Perhaps problems of ambivalence arise when there are 
incommensurable choices. In the case of abortion policy, the choices are clear and 
stark. One can either permit the abortion of the fetus, or one requires the mother 
to carry the fetus to term. Racial policy, perhaps, permits compromises. Setting 
aside some contracts for black-owned businesses, making some allowances for higher 
taxes for minority schools, admitting some black students under affirmative action 
guidelines may not do grievous damage to principles of individualism, while perhaps 
accommodating a more egalitarian policy. 
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4 Appendix 1 :  Coding of Variables and Confirma­
tory Factor Analyses Results 
We employed the following coding scheme prior to the confirmatory factor analysis: 
Modern Racism: "Attention to minority problems" is scaled from l=too much 
attention, 3=About the right amount, 5=Not paying enough attention. "Anger about 
giving blacks and other minorities special advantages" and "Anger about spokesmen 
for minorities who are always complaining" are scaled from 0 "doesn't bother you at 
all" to 10 "makes you extremely angry and upset." 
Anti-black Stereotyping: All variables are answers to questions of the form "(How 
about) X?" On a scale from 0 to 10, how well do you think it describes most blacks?" 
where 0 is "very inaccurate" and 10 is "very accurate." The traits in X included 
"Aggressive or violent," "Lazy," "Boastful," "Irresponsible," and "Complaining." 
Authoritarianism: All variables are answers to questions of the form "(How about) 
X?" On a scale from 0 to 10, how important is that to you?" where 0 is "one of the 
least important things" and 10 is "one of the absolutely most important things." The 
set X included: "Preserving the traditional ideas of right and wrong," "Respect for 
authority," "Following God's will," "Improving standards of politeness in everyday 
behavior," "Strengthening law and order," and "Respect for American power." 
Individualism: The first two variables are answers to questions of the form "(How 
about) X?" On a scale from 0 to 10, how important is that to you?" where 0 is "one of 
the least important things" and 10 is "one of the absolutely most important things." 
The set X included "Self-reliance" and "Individual job achievement and excellence." 
The last variable is an answer to a question "On a scale from zero to ten, how much 
does 'Interfering Government officials' anger you?" 
Anti-semitism: All variables are answers to four point Likert scale questions, 
where l=Agree strongly, 3=Agree somewhat, 5=Disagree somewhat, and 7=Disagree 
strongly. The questions included "Most Jews are ambitious and work hard to suc­
ceed," "Most Jews are more willing than other people to use shady practices to get 
ahead in life," "Most Jews believe that they are better than other people," "Most 
Jews in general are inclined to be more loyal to Israel than to America," and "Most 
Jews don't care what happens to people who aren't Jewish." 
Egalitarianism: The first two questions are answers to four point Likert scales, 
ranging from (1) strongly in favor, (3) somewhat in favor, (5) somewhat opposed, 
and (7) strongly opposed. The questions were "How about 'more money being spent 
to reduce unemployment?'  " and "How about 'narrowing the gap in income between 
the rich and the poor?' " The last variable is an answer to a question "(How about) 
When people are treated unfairly because of their race? On a scale from zero to ten, 
how much does this anger you?" 
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Table 5: Confirmatory factor loadings for scales, 1991 Race and Politics Survey 
Variable 
Modern Racism 
Attention to minority problems 
Anger about giving blacks and other minorities special advantages . 
Anger about spokesmen for minorities who are always complaining 
Anti-Black Stereotyping 
Aggressive or violent 
Lazy 
Boastful 
Irresponsible 
Complaining 
Authoritarianism 
Preserving the traditional ideas of right and wrong 
Respect for authority 
Following God's will 
Improving standards of politeness in everyday behavior 
Strengthening law and order 
Respect for American power 
Individualism 
Self-reliance 
Individual job achievement and excellence 
Interfering Government officials 
Anti-Semitism 
Loading 
1.00 
-.27 
-.34 
1.00 
.87 
.63 
.77 
.68 
1.00 
.91 
.74 
.71 
.76 
.78 
1 .00 
.30 
.15 
Most Jews are ambitious and work hard to succeed 1.00 
Most Jews are more willing than other people to use shady prac-
tices to get ahead in life .85 
Most Jews believe that they are better than other people .90 
Most Jews in general are inclined to be more loyal to Israel than 
to America . 76 
Most Jews don't care what happens to people who aren't Jewish .86 
Egalitarianism 
How about "more money being spent to reduce unemployment?" 1.00 
How about "narrowing the gap in income between the rich and 
the poor?" .33 
(How about) When people are treated unfairly because of their 
race? -.13 
Cell entries are factor loadings. Scales derived from the confirmatory factory 
models are coerced to the range 0-1, with modern racism, authoritarianism, 
and egalitarianism reversed. All coefficients are significant at p < .01. 
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5 Appendix 2:  Heteroskedastic Probit as a Tool 
for Understanding Conflictual Attitudes 
A more thorough review of the mechanics of heteroskedastic probit may be found in 
our paper (Alvarez and Brehm 1995) , as well as in one prominent econometrics text(Greene 1993) . Each of the dependent variables we consider in the next section of
this paper is dichotomous, leading towards the usual probit or logit likelihood: 
N 
log L(?r lY) = L Yi log ?ri + (l - yi) * log(l - 7r) (1) 
i=l 
Where 7r is reparameterized as a function, /() , (usually a probit or logit function) of
a set of explanatory variables ( X) :
1ri = f(Xd3) (2) 
We refer to this function (2) as the "choice model." The standard probit or logit 
assumes that the variance of the choice function is constant, and can be standardized 
to 1 .  
Our innovation is to notice that choice is sometimes heterogeneous, that the un­
derlying variance of the choice function is not constant. Borrowing from Harvey's 
'multiplicative heteroskedasticity' approach (1976) , we reparameterize the variance
for an individual's choice (var(Ei) )  as a function of an additional set of explanatory
variables ( Z) : 
(3) 
(Exponentiation is required in order to keep variance· greater than zero) . We refer to
this second function (3) as the "variance model."
This leads to a variation on the usual probit log-likelihood: 
log L = I: (Yi log <I> ( Xi� ) + (1 - yi) log 
[
1 - <I> ( 
Xi
� ) ] ) 
(4) 
i exp •'Y exp •'Y 
We have successfully estimated this function using Gauss and Shazam, two popular 
econometrics packages. 
There is an implicit test for the presence of heterogeneity with the addition of 
the variables in the denominator to the likelihood. If the variables in the variance 
function in the denominator add no new information, then the likelihood for the 
heteroskedastic probit (4) will not be appreciably different from the likelihood for the 
standard probit (1) . The test is then
LR = 2 x (LH - Ls) (5) 
where LH is the log-likelihood for the heteroskedastic probit (4) , and Ls is the log­
likelihood for the standard probit (1) . The LR is distributed as a x2 with as many
degrees of freedom as there are Z variables. 
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